The mystery of the difficulty of being available for sale

@新 新 新

Author 丨 Li Lili Yue See

Edit 丨 Monthly

It has been nearly six months since the time of the submission of the listing of Weimei, and there is still no news of the hearing.

If you have not passed the listed hearing for half a year, the earlier prospectus will be labeled as expired for six months. If the company still has a listing intention, it needs to be submitted to the prospectus. That also means that if Wei Meizi has not passed the listed hearing in early August, the prospectus needs to be submitted again.

The name We Meizi may be a little strange in most people, but its two core brands "Shuke" and "Shuke Baby" can be seen everywhere in most merchants.

Since Yunnan Baiyao was listed in 1993 and the two -sided needle was listed in 2004, domestic toothpaste seemed to be calm in the capital market.

Until recently, two more toothpaste brands tried to seek breakthroughs through the secondary market. One is the cold acid spirit, and its parent company Dengkang Oral is preparing to land on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to go public. The other is Vi Meizi. In 2020, Weimei ranked fourth in the retail price of all Chinese oral care companies, with a market share of 5.3%.

In fact, in the past ten years, the domestic toothpaste market is still in the wind. From Tianqi auction and two stitches to survive, to the birth of new brands such as USMile and Su Shi, the domestic oral care market has changed a lot. At this time, Dengkang's mouth and Weimei are competing for listing, which is a key battle for the brand to seek breakthroughs and obtain more market voice rights.

Now that the difficulty in looking back at the road of Weimei's listing, whether it is the treatment of the equity relationship before the capital listing, or the status quo of its own business, it seems that it has already been unknown.

01 Has the duck -style listing

In 2006, Wang Ziquan, who came out of Lan Moon, founded Weimei, and also pulled up the colleague Cao Rui'an, who was also in Lan Moon.

The start of the two is still good. After successfully aiming at the category of toothpaste, they successfully break through from Procter & Gamble and a lot of domestic brands through differentiation: the packaging is different from traditional domestic products, and the marketing method is imitated with big names, big inputs, and mainly attacked the KA channel. It can be said that it is the first -generation apprentice of the international daily chemical brand.

On the one hand, Shuke toothpaste launched high -priced products in Yunnan Baiyao, while imitating offline channels for Blue Moon, through human sea tactics, and inviting Beckham and Li Bingbing as the spokesperson, quickly played the brand awareness.

According to Ferrisana, based on the calculation of the retail sales of all oral care products in 2020, Vi Meizi ranked fourth in China with a market share of 5.3%. Among them, the market share of Weimei Children's mouth care products accounted for 20.4%in 2022, just as the market share of whitening toothpaste was 11.3%, all of which were in a leading position.

Nevertheless, due to the frustration of offline sales in the past two years, offline dealers accounted for more than 30%of Weimei. If you only look at operating profits, in the third quarter of 2021, it only increased by 3.18%compared with 2020. It is more urgent.

In 2014, Vi Meizi conducted a Series A financing. Lenovo Holdings, a subsidiary of Lenovo Holdings, entered the game with Beijing Junlian Maolin's equity investment partnership (limited partnership) (hereinafter referred to as "Junlian Maolin"), holding 17.87% of the shares ; In 2016, OceanView Expres (shareholders are Lanxin Asia), Ningbo Zhongding, Suzhou Zhongding and other institutions companies conduct B -round financing of the company.

However, in 2021, Wei Meizi's equity changed four rounds in March, May, July, and August, which also aroused regulatory attention. In the above -mentioned equity changes, in addition to introducing many institutional investors such as Huafeng Capital and Qingdao Turing, Weimei also involved equity disputes between the company's founders and institutional shareholders.

According to the prospectus, Lanxin Asia and Zhong Ding Capital, which participated in the B round of financing, applied for judicial frozen in mid -2020, the assets of the above -mentioned Wang Ziquan, Cao Ruian, and Yu Litao, which did not reconcile until March last year. In the end, the two parties agreements, Zhuhai Shuke, established by the above -mentioned founders, took over some of the above -mentioned institutions at the cost of over 70 million in April 2021.

The reason for the note of the Weimezi prospectus is related to a series of equity operations of the four executives of the founders Wang Ziquan, Cao Ruian, Yu Litao, and Du Hong. In just two months from the executives to the institution, the company's valuation has been nearly 3 times from 595 million yuan to 1.95 billion yuan. At the same time, the institution also signed a listing of gambling agreements with the company while investing.

The prospectus remarks show that Ruo Weimei cannot complete the listing before January 1, 2020, or other accidents occur, and investment institutions have the right to redeem part or all investments. Therefore, from the first quarter to the third quarter of 2021, many investment institutions that have not yet waited for the news of the listing, Lanxin Asia and Zhong Ding Capital were in mid -2020. They successfully applied for judicial frozen assets of the three founders through prosecution and redeemed them. Investment of 122 million yuan.

Although the redemption was only part of the funds, and Veimi quickly drafted the new contract to cancel the "redemption right", the institutions of the long -term listing process also had a certain impact on Weimei's financial report data. The book shows that in the third quarter of 2021, Vi Meizi's ownership of shareholders of listed companies lost 493 million yuan.

Fortunately, the financial report shows that in 2021, 573 million yuan of financing injection, which made the net profit of Weimei in the third quarter of 2021 still 128 million yuan, a steady increase of 36.16%year -on -year. However, compared with the industry leader of Yunnan, which has revenue more than 5.1 billion yuan in 2020, Veimi's revenue is still slightly worse. Investment institutions' "step -by -step" to reflect the difficulty of the listing of domestic toothpaste brands.

However, in order to make a great consumer brand, we must not only work hard under marketing and capital operation, but also spend their thoughts on product research and development.

02 R & D and growth, the two mountains that are difficult to overcome

The most often questioned point of Weimei is the insufficient investment in R & D.

According to the prospectus, the R & D rate of Weimei is less than 2%, and the number of R & D people accounts for less than 4%. It is at a low level in the industry. According to the number of R & D people, it is 25.

Compared with the prospectus at the same time, as of the last feasible date, Weimei has a total of 61 new products or upgraded products is under development, including 11 toothpaste, 9 types of mouthwash, 2 oral spray agents, and 16 electric inadtum care products. , 18 manual toothbrushes and 5 other new product categories. And Weimei's expenditure in R & D in 2019, 2020 and 2021 in R & D expenditure was only 25 million yuan, 27 million yuan and 122 million yuan.

Compared with similar enterprises, such as Yunnan Baiyao in 2020 and 2021, R & D expenditure was 181 million yuan and 331 million yuan, respectively, accounting for 0.55%and 0.91%in revenue. Can I really support these 61 new products with the R & D expenditure and 25 R & D personnel?

In addition, if Shuke’s R & D investment continues to meet the requirements of high -tech enterprises, after the three -year preferential period, the tax rate of Shuke in 2022 will increase from 15%to 25%. No small blow.

It is understood that the insufficient investment in R & D or the "third -party" business model of Weimeizi is related to the "third party" business model. The main task of Weimei is brand operation and sales. From the perspective of employee composition, a total of 738 employees in Weimei, of which 545 were sold and marketers, accounting for 74%. The total person in the supply chain, R & D and quality control accounts for only 12%.

In this model, Weimei can reduce capital investment such as equipment and warehouse investment, and put more funds into core businesses such as sales. However, while reducing capital investment, this "third -party" approach has derived problems such as "difficult quality control", and often makes some low -level mistakes that should not be committed. For example, consumers purchased two groups of six "Shuke" enzyme whitening toothpaste in the live broadcast room of Li Jiaqi last year. For 3 yuan for 114 yuan.

After more than ten days of using the toothpaste, consumers found that they had brilliant powder in their mouths, toothbrushes, and brushing cups when brushing their teeth. Essence The Shuke toothpaste he bought in batches occurred in the batch. According to the above -mentioned Shuke's official flagship store, "Toothpaste tube coloring is due to abnormal UV curing during the printing process, and the response to individual pastes causes color loss", it can be inferred that powder coatings or UV paint can be inferred.

At the same time, the market share in the Chinese children's oral care market reached 20.4%, ranking first "Shuto Baby" toothpaste. A number of evaluations on the social network pointed out from the ingredient table that Shuk children's toothpaste uses sodium elagenate sulfate (SLS) as a foaming agent, and SLS is a stimulating component that stimulates the oral mucosa and the upper respiratory tract , Also exacerbate inflammation and wound worsening. Therefore, this children's toothpaste component is not so safe.

Prior to this, the quality of Shuke's products was on the list many times. In 2017, the Hubei Provincial Administration of Industry and Commerce conducted a quality spot check on children's utensils and cultural supplies. Among them, Veimi's Shuke sound wave electric toothbrush and Shuke baby electric toothbrush were all detected and explained by CCTV consumption claims.

Three years later, due to the product quality, the product quality was made. In 2020, the Hangzhou Consumer Rights Protection Protection Commission detected that the Shuk toothner was unqualified and pointed out that it did not meet the three items of "sign and explanation, humidity resistance, and structure".

In addition to the quality of the product, the daily operations are also very casual. Two years ago, Vi Mizi's official website was hacked for ten days (the official website showed the casino information) but no one ignored it. Most of the complaints with Shuke are not resolved.

Some consumers still stay in the inherent impression of Shuke high -end toothpaste, but what about it later? How can we let young people pay for young people to sleep on the "credit book"?

In the era of young population cavity, how should the old domestic products catch up?

At present, the direction of the widening of the emerging dental track is outside the toothpaste and toothbrush.

The oral market ushered in more segmentation. This track has appeared in relatively professional brands, and it is far from toothpaste business. If there is no major direction of the power of Shuke, it is difficult for these categories to become a brand that has become an Internet celebrity brand, and it will also "be in the stubbornness".

From the perspective of JD.com's "White Paper in the Oral Industry Trend", refined oral care products such as portable tooth rushing device and mouthwash have grown faster than traditional products such as toothpaste; at the same time, consumers are more willing to choose traditional nursing products such as toothpaste Try various new concepts.

This development trend means that who can make differentiation, vertical and specialized products around at least one new concept, who will occupy the consumer's mind again, and even achieve the anti -overtaking of traditional brands in a short period of time, like a short time, like the traditional brand, like a short time, like the traditional brand, just like it is like a short time, just like the traditional brand is like Yunnan Baiyao, who once declined with the concept of dimension and dimension in medicine.

The best example is the new domestic mouthwash brand "Ginseng", focusing on the addition of mouthwash on the basis of sterilization -fresh breath, at the same time focusing on the dilemma of stimulating the taste, successfully entered the hinterland of the mouthwash giant Li Shidelin, the hinterland of the mouthful Essence

But unfortunately, this is exactly what Weimei lacks. In 2015, Wei Meizi expanded the electrical professional oral care business and launched products such as dental floss and portable mouthwash.

In the emerging fields of toothner and electric toothbrush products, Shuke's products are similar to most products in the market. Living behind others.

Vichi chose to seek the help of the capital market at this time, perhaps the best way to break through many products. At present, Shuke's idea is to go in the direction of technology and intelligence (the strength of electric toothbrushes, tooth flusher and other products), which is also the actual needs of listed companies.

However, some people in the industry have analyzed that, as a traditional toothpaste company, Shuke, the professionalism of product research and development and product quality need to be further strengthened. Compared with their peers, Vi Meizi does not have its own production line, but outsourcing with OEM and ODM The method replace the production session. The main task of the company is brand operation and sales. In an increasingly fierce segmentation track, excessive research and development investment is becoming a high -end barrier of Weimei Card.

At the same time, the oral nursing track does not have the speed of explosive growth, and the polishing rhythm of products and users is relatively slow. Shuke wants to be in the market, which is difficult. To sum up, Shuke urgently needs to find its own product positioning and find a second growth curve in the segment. After completing the thrills of capital, the problem faced by Weimei just started.

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